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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
CONFRONTATION OF WITNESSES AS APPLICABLE TO THE STATES
THROUGH THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Petitioner was arrested in Texas, charged with armed
robbery, and taken before a state judge for a preliminary hear-
ing in which he was not represented by counsel; however, there
was no prohibition against counsel at the preliminary hearing.'
Petitioner was allowed to cross-examine the witnesses if he so
desired, and he did cross-examine some of the witnesses but
not the alleged victim who had identified petitioner as the rob-
ber. Petitioner was subsequently indicted for the robbery and
brought to trial. Because the alleged victim had moved out
of the state and did not intend to return for the trial, the prosecu-
tion sought to introduce as evidence a transcript of the victim's
testimony identifying petitioner, which was taken at the pre-
liminary hearing. Defense counsel objected that admission of
the transcript would violate petitioner's right of confrontation
of witnesses under the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the
United iStates Constitution. These objections were overruled
by the trial judge for the reason that petitioner had been
present at the preliminary hearing and had there been afforded
the opportunity of cross-examining the witness, even though
petitioner had not been afforded an opportunity to cross-ex-
amine through counsel.2  Petitioner was convicted of robbery
1. TEXAS CODE CRIM. PRoc. arts. 245-266 (1925). In Texas the preliminary
hearing does not accept pleas of guilty or not guilty, but only decides whether
or not the accused should be bound over for the grand jury and, if so, whether
or not he should be allowed bail. The Code provides that the accused may be
represented by counsel if he so desires, but counsel is not appointed for him at
this stage in the criminal proceedings. In the instant case, the question was
raised whether failure to appoint counsel at the preliminary hearing denied
petitioner the assistance of counsel within the meaning of Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963), but the issue was not decided by the Court, which reserved
judgment as to whether the Texas preliminary hearing was so critical a stage
in the proceedings as to require the appointment of counsel. The cases of White
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963), and Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961),
were distinguished on the ground that in each of these cases pleas to the charge
could be entered at the preliminary hearing.
2. The TEXAS CODE CRiM. PROC. arts. 250, 252 (1925) provides that the
accused must be present at the preliminary hearing and that he or his counsel
has the right to direct- and cross-examination of witnesses.
It is well settled that the right of confrontation includes the right of cross-
examination. See McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 19 (1954). Generally, the require-
ment in the states is that an opportunity for effective cross-examination must be
afforded. See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1371, 1394 (3d ed. 1940). However, it
does not appear to be well settled whether the accused must be afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine through counsel. See McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 231
(1954). In some situations it seems evident that cross-examination in the
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under the Texas statute3 and the conviction was affirmed by
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals over petitioner's renewed
contention that the use of the transcript as evidence denied
him rights guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amend-
ments.4 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed
and remanded. Held, the sixth amendment right of an accused
to confront the witnesses against him is of such a fundamental
nature that it is deemed essential for a fair trial and is thus
made applicable to state prosecutions through the fourteenth
amendment according to the same standards applicable in fed-
eral prosecutions. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
Prior to the instant case, as was evident from West v. Louisi-
ana,' the sixth amendment right of confrontation was not ef-
fective against the states through the fourteenth amendment.
The basis of the West decision was that the fundamental rights
of citizens in state proceedings were adequately protected by the
due process guarantee of a fair trial, and that incorporation
of the sixth amendment into the fourteenth amendment was
thus unnecessary.6 On the facts in West the Court concluded
that the petitioner had been afforded due process of law7 and
absence of counsel would be ineffective, but in the informal atmosphere of a
preliminary hearing under Texas law, cross-examination by the accused might
be adequate.
3. TEXAS PENAL CODE art. 1408 (1925). In accordance with the statute,
petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment.
4. Pointer v. State, 375 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
5. 194 U.S. 258 (1904) ; accord, Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
6. From its earliest decisions interpreting the fourteenth amendment, the
approach of the Supreme Court has been to protect only those rights which were
felt to be fundamental. See, e.g., Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961);
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937) ; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) ; Hebert v. Louisiana, 272
U.S. 312 (1926) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Maxwell v. Dow,
176 U.S. 581 (1900) ; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) ; Hurtado v. Cali-
fornia, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) ; Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1872). If the right was required by "certain immutable principles of justice
which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union
may disregard" (Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898)), it was protected
from state infringement by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment;
if it was not so fundamental, it was not applied to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Due process was later defined by the Supreme Court
as action that is "consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions and not infrequently
are designated as 'law of the land.' " Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316
(1926). Further attempts to define due process are too numerous to mention,
but they all convey the idea that due process is action that is "of the very
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937).
7. In West the witness had been cross-examined through counsel at the
preliminary hearing. When the prosecution was unable to produce the witness
at the trial, a transcript of his earlier testimony was introduced into evidence.
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expressed the view that the right to confrontation was not so
basic or fundamental as to be absolutely necessary, so long
as a fair trial was achieved without it. Since West, however,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly termed the right of confron-
tation fundamental, essential, and basic to a fair trial., The
language in many of these decisions appears inconsistent with
the holding in the West case.9
An early decision of the Supreme Court10 rejecting the idea
that the entire Bill of Rights was incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment indicated that some of the provisions of the first
eight amendments might possibly be protected from state
action because a denial of these freedoms "would be a denial
of due process of law."'1 The Court added that such provisions
would be protected, not because they were contained in the Bill
of Rights, but because they were so fundamental as to be
essential to due process.12
Throughout the Court's history, individual liberties have
increasingly been absorbed into the fourteenth amendment
as being so fundamental that they were protected by the due
It appears that perhaps the instant case would have been decided in accordance
with West if there had been an opportunity to cross-examine through counsel at
the hearing. The majority opinion states that "the case before us would be quite
a different one had Phillips' statement been taken at a full-fledged hearing at
which petitioner had been represented by counsel who had been given a complete
and adequate opportunity to cross-examine." 85 Sup. Ct. 1065, 1069-70 (1965).
8. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
474 (1959) ; In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) ; Alford v. United States, 282
U.S. 687 (1931). The decision in the Turner case was not as broad as the instant
decision but the Court said that " 'evidence developed' against a defendant shall
come from a witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial
protection of the defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of
counsel." 379 U.S. 466, 472. See also Willner v. Commission on Character &
Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
A collection of state and English cases is found in 5 WIGMORE, EvmENCAN§§ 1367, 1395 (3d ed. 1940). For state constitutional and statutory provisions
similar to the sixth amendment protection, see id. § 1397, n.l.
9. But see Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
10. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
11. Id. at 99. Since the passage of the fourteenth amendment, ten Justices
have expressed the view that it incorporates the entire Bill of Rights and applies
it to the states. Justices Bradley and Swayne took that position in the Slaughter
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), as did Justice Clifford in Walker v.
Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875). A similar position was taken by Justices Field,
Harlan, and Brewer in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892), and by Justices
Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947). However, this position has never commanded a majority on the Court.
12. 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908). The opinion in Twining seems to raise the
question whether all of the provisions in the Bill of Rights are really fundamental.
For example, is the seventh amendment guarantee of a jury trial in all civil
suits involving a sum in excess of twenty dollars fundamental to the maintenance
of a democratic society?
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process clause. When these freedoms were incorporated into
the fourteenth amendment, they were held to be governed by
the same standards applicable to the federal government. As
late as 1922, it was held that the Constitution did not restrict
the states in matters pertaining to freedom of speech, 18 but
within three years there began a series of decisions which held
the entire first amendment protected from state infringment. 14
Similarly, the fourth amendment freedoms were at one time
held not protected from encroachment by the states,15 but recent
cases have brought them within the protection of the due
process clause. 16 An early decision brought the fifth amend-
ment's just compensation clause within the area of protection
from state action because it was felt to be fundamental to the
maintenance of our free society. 17 Last year Malloy v. Hogan18
held the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment ap-
plicable to the states according to the federal standard. This
case overruled prior decisions holding that the privilege against
self-incrimination did not limit the states because it was not a
fundamental freedom. 19  In 1963, the assistance-of-counsel
provision of the sixth amendment was likewise applied to state
proceedings,2 0 even though earlier decisions had held that it
did not apply to the states.2' The eighth amendment's prohibi-
tion of cruel and unusual punishments is now applicable to the
states22 despite earlier decisions to the contrary.2 3
Since the instant decision applies the right of confrontation
and cross-examination to the states in accordance with the
13. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922).
14. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). See New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366
U.S. 293 (1961) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) ; Lovell v. City
of Griffen, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) ; DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
15. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) ; Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914).
16. Mapp v. Ohio,, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) ; Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206 (1960) ; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
17. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
18. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
19. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961) ; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46 (1947) ; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) ; Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
20. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
21. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932).
22. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
23. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892) ; McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S.
165 (1891) ; In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
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federal standard, it is necessary to determine what the federal
standard is. The Court explicitly states that the right of cross-
examination is not satisfied unless there is cross-examination
through counsel.24  It is questionable whether this requirement
had previously existed, 25 though some decisions seem to begin
with the assumption that "cross-examination" is synonymous
with "cross-examination through counsel. '26  These decisions
perhaps suggested that normally cross-examination by someone
other than counsel would be ineffective. Uncertainty on this
particular point of federal law is ended by the instant case, which
establishes a definite rule for both federal and state courts.
In holding that the sixth amendment right of confrontation
is obligatory on the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, the Court in the instant case classified
the right of confrontation as fundamental and basic-a right
in the absence of which there could be no fair trial. The Court
adopted the premise that the right of cross-examination is in-
cluded within the right of an accused to confront the witnesses
against him, and then used the broad language of Gideon v.
Wainwright to express the idea that any provision of the first
eight amendments which is "fundamental and essential to a fair
24. The majority opinion states that "because the transcript of Phillips' state-
ment offered against petitioner at his trial had not been taken at a time and
under circumstances affording petitioner through counsel an adequate opportunity
to cross-examine Phillips, its introduction in a federal court in a criminal case
against Pointer would have amounted to denial of the privilege of confrontation
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." 85 Sup. Ct. 1065, 1070 (1965). (Emphasis
added.)
25. It appears that the federal position on this narrow point has never been
definitively stated. Apparently, until Pointer, the federal courts had never been
called upon to decide whether the right of cross-examination had been abridged
when cross-examination through counsel was lacking. There is, however, language
in many federal cases implying that an opportunity to cross-examine is all that
is required. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 234 F.2d 140 (6th Cir. 1956);
Kemp v. Government of Canal Zone, 167 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1948) ; Curtis v.
Rives, 123 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1941) ; United States v. Talbot, 133 F. Supp. 120
(Alaska 1955) ; United States v. Barracota, 45 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. N.Y. 1942).
The language of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in the area dealing
with cross-examination at the preliminary hearing seems to imply that only the
opportunity to cross-examine is required. See FED. It. CitM. P. 40(b) (3).
For the majority state position see 5 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1371, 1394 (3d
ed. 1940). This text and the supporting cases express the conclusion that actual
cross-examination is not required but only an opportunity to exercise the right
if so desired. Section 1394 states that "lack of counsel does not necessarily import
lack of opportunity to cross-examine." The opportunity for effective cross-
examination appears to be the requirement as interpreted by Professor Wigmore.
But see note 26 infra and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965); In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 273, 275, 278 (1948) ; Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691-
92 (1931) ; Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 468 (1900).
NOTES
trial" 27 is therefore obligatory on the states through the four-
teenth amendment. The Court stated that inclusion of the right
of confrontation in the Bill of Rights reflected the belief of
the draftsmen that it was basic to our free society.28  In
overruling West, the Court reasoned that the West decision was
based on the proposition that the sixth amendment in its
entirety did not apply to the states, and that since Gideon, this
proposition was untrue; hence, that West was no longer valid.
Finally, in emphasizing its present position on incorporating
various provisions of the Bill of Rights within the fourteenth
amendment, the Court quoted from Malloy: "The Court has not
hesitated to reexamine past decisions according the Fourteenth
Amendment a less central role in the preservation of basic
liberties than that which was contemplated by its Framers when
they added the Amendment to our constitutional scheme." '
Thus, the rule that an accused must be afforded an adequate op-
portunity to cross-examine an adverse witness through counsel
required the conclusion in this case that introduction of the
transcript at the trial was a denial of the right of confrontation
guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments.
It should be added that the Court took note of exceptions
to the right of cross-examination such as dying declarations
and the testimony of a deceased witness given at a former
trial, 0 and stated that nothing in the instant decision was
intended to overrule these exceptions. The Court also suggested
that if petitioner had been afforded the privilege of cross-
examination through counsel at the preliminary hearing, the
present decision might have been different.8'
The instant decision is part of a trend toward more complete
application at the state level of the individual freedoms enu-
merated in the first eight amendments to the Constitution. The
present concept of what is basic to justice includes more personal
liberty than did the prevailing concept of an earlier era. Be-
27. 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
28. See cases cited notes 8 and 9 supra.
29. 378 U.S. 1, 5 (1964).
30. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
31. See notes 2 and 7 supra. The Court seems to indicate that if there had
been cross-examination through counsel at the preliminary hearing then the
transcript of this testimony could have been introduced into evidence at the trial
in the absence of the witness. Basically, this was the factual situation in the
West case, and it appears that West could be reconciled with the instant decision
except for its broad language that the entire sixth amendment does not apply
to the states. 194 U.S. 258, 264 (1904).
19651
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cause of this, personal privileges and freedoms are receiving
more protection from state abuse than they once did. The
minority position, as expressed in separate concurring opinions
by Justices Harlan and Stewart, was that the state conviction
should be reversed because absence of an opportunity to confront
and cross-examine the witness, through counsel, was a denial
of due process of law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment,
but that the fourteenth amendment should be controlling in-
dependently of the sixth. Justice Harlan argued that the Court
had not incorporated the first eight amendments in toto was
evidence that not all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights are
fundamental, 3 2 yet the Court ignored the possibility that all
parts of any one provision may not necessarily be fundamental.
The traditional and indispensable diversity of the federal system,
subject of course to due process of law, was also alluded to by
Justice Harlan as a reason not to bind the states rigidly in the
area of criminal law enforcement. The minority view would
afford adequate protection for the individual liberties deemed
fundamental, and, at the same time, would be more in keeping
with the language and apparent intent of the fourteenth amend-
ment. However, the majority holding is definite and explicit
and also clarifies the federal rule. It appears that the other
states with a Texas-type preliminary hearing, including Loui-
siana,8 3 will be compelled to modify their procedure to bring
it in accordance with the instant decision.
John M. Wilson
SECURITY DEVICES-PLEDGE-REQUIREMENT OF DISPOSSESSION
Plaintiff financed the purchase of a used automobile through
defendant corporation. Delinquent on three installment pay-
ments, plaintiff "pledged" the car to defendant in consideration
of an extension of thirteen days and agreement by defendant
not to bring suit during the extension period. The agreement
provided that if the installment notes remained unpaid at the
end of the extension period, defendant could sell the car without
resort to legal process; the car, however, remained in plaintiff's
32. See notes 10, 11, 12 supra.
33. See LA. R.S. 15:153-155 (1950).
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